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Summary 
 
The debate between modernization theory and its opponents is over. Neither evidence 
nor argument can support the claim that authoritarianism is necessary for economic 
development. However, is democracy necessary for development, as opposed to 
obviously being desirable on other grounds? The evidence on how democracy 
actually operates in developing countries raises important questions about the 
relationship between markets, states, and democracies. In particular, the role of 
patron-client networks in these countries questions the relevance of the standard 
arguments made for the positive economic effects of democracy in developing 
countries. There is, however, an argument from the neo-Weberian school that claims 
that democratization can begin to undermine the patron-client relationships (neo-
patrimonialism) that  impede development. But in fact, there are powerful structural 
reasons why this is not likely to happen. Economic characteristics of developing 
countries make patron-client politics both rational for redistributive coalitions and 
effective as strategies for achieving the goals of powerful constituencies within these 
coalitions. These are unlikely to be affected by democratization. The evidence 
strongly supports our analysis. If this is right, and if many types of patron-client 
politics are damaging for development, democratization is unlikely to accelerate 
economic development. The case for democratization has to be made on other 
grounds.   
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Democracy is a system of rules for electing the executive and the legislature that 
constitutes the government of a society through a process of competitive and 
contested elections. The relationship between democracy and the developmental 
performance of markets and states, particularly in the developing world, has been at 
the heart of some of the most intense debates in economics, political science, and 
development studies. On the one hand, the evidence is overwhelming that rich 
countries can sustain viable democracies, while poor countries often cannot. The data 
that shows that more developed economies have more sustainable democracies is 
about as conclusive as data in social science can be. The debate has instead been over 
the extent to which democracy allows or is even necessary for economic 
development. On this critical question, political opinion has swung dramatically away 
from the modernization theories that held sway till two decades ago, but on many 
substantive questions, the jury is still out.  
 
The historical evidence can be interpreted in various ways depending on the samples 
chosen and the period examined, but taken as a whole, the evidence on the impact of 
democracy on development is inconclusive. There are enough exceptions on both 
sides of the argument to suggest that neither democracy nor authoritarianism is a 
precondition for development. We can find examples of rapid growth in the set of 
countries that were democratic as well as in the set that was authoritarian. Similarly, 
we can find (unfortunately even more) examples of economic stagnation in the set of 
countries that were democratic as well as in the set that was authoritarian. Since most 
people would agree that democracy is better than its absence, this evidence can be 
interpreted as an argument for democracy. However, the evidence can also be 
interpreted to mean that democracy is not necessarily a precondition for economic 
development. It follows that the policy priority given to democratization in recent 
years may be diverting us from more important priorities that may be necessary to 
achieve the prosperity required for making democracy both more sustainable and 
capable of delivering real decision-making powers to societies. In this article, I 
examine some important but often neglected aspects of the two-way relationship 
between democracy and economic development by looking at how democracy affects 
and is affected by the operation of markets and states in developing countries. This, in 
turn, leads us to examining the implications of these observations for political reform 
strategies in developing countries. 
 
To understand how democracy operates in developing countries, our starting point 
will be to argue that we need to look more closely at why political contestation in 
developing countries is organized through the mobilizations of patron-client factions, 
rather than through the mobilization of class or economic interest groups. We argue 
that these political features of developing countries are intimately connected to the 
underdevelopment of economies, the limited scope of viable capitalist economies in 
developing societies, and the inevitable social transformations that these societies are 
experiencing. The factional mobilizations that are characteristic of this period can, 
and often do, have negative effects on economic development and political stability. 
This could explain not only why democracies are vulnerable in developing countries, 
but also why economic growth is often so fragile.  
 
However, factional conflicts and contests over resources do not necessarily have to 
lead to either economic stagnation or the breakdown of democracy. In some cases, 
democracy may be a viable mechanism of managing these conflicts, and factional 
 3 
conflicts can drive economic growth in some contexts. The economic outcomes of 
democratic management of factional conflicts are therefore not well-defined without a 
further examination of the specific patron-client networks and factions that are 
involved in particular countries. The example of India demonstrates how factional 
politics operating through democratic institutions can allow a country to continue its 
transition to a specific type of capitalist economy. While some countries such as India 
have done well with democracy, the bigger policy question is about the viability of 
the democratization reforms that are being promoted across the world by international 
agencies. Here, I argue that without understanding the role of patron-client factions in 
the politics of developing countries, programmes of democratization are often missing 
the point, even from the narrow perspective of deepening the entrenchment of 
democracy. The first of the following sections reviews a number of conventional 
theories linking democracy to development and points out how these theories are 
undermined by the presence of factional politics in developing countries. The next 
section presents some of the extensive evidence showing that developing country 
democracies are in fact characterized by intense patron-client politics and are quite 
different in their operation from advanced country democracies. The third section 
presents an alternative way of explaining the dominance of patron-client politics in 
developing countries based on structural features of their economies. This analysis has 
significant implications both for the debate between modernization theory and its 
opponents and for the support for democratization coming from theories of neo-
patrimonialism that have become very influential as part of the good governance 
agenda. The last section summarizes some of the conclusions.  
 
 
 
Conventional Theories of Democracy and Development 
 
Conventional theories of democracy and development present abstract arguments 
linking democracy with economic outcomes. Their general argument, however, is 
undermined if we bring into the analysis specific features of developing countries, in 
particular, as will be explained below, the issues of patron-client networks and 
factional politics. The case for democracy has to be built on other grounds, and the 
policies that are required for making democracy viable need to be identified using 
other more appropriate theories. It is therefore useful to begin with a brief review of 
the main types of arguments that are conventionally presented about the links between 
democracies on the one hand and the operation of markets and states on the other. 
There are three major arguments linking democracy to the more efficient operation of 
markets and states, which consequently has a positive effect on developmental 
outcomes. The first argument focuses on the better use of information in democracies. 
This, in turn, allows for better preference identification, better policy and project 
choice or simply disaster avoidance. The second argument  focuses on the procedural 
advantage of democracy in allowing more rapid institutional change in the direction 
of greater efficiency. The third argument focuses on the advantage of democracy in 
maintaining the stability of the political system and of property rights, both essential 
for economic development. I summarize each argument ,in turn, and consider how the 
patron-client political characteristics of developing countries can undermine them. 
Finally, I consider, in a later section, a fourth, neo-Weberian argument, which  claims 
that democracy is essential for overcoming patron-client politics. 
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Information-based Arguments for Democracy 
 
The most obvious argument linking democracy with development is that the 
competition for office reveals information for current and future policy-makers that 
could not otherwise have been generated. We have to distinguish here between 
information that allows preference identification (what do the ‘people’ want), 
information that enables better policy and project choice, and information that allows 
governments to avoid major catastrophes.  
 
The preference identification argument is the least convincing. It is not at all clear, 
even in theory, what democracy can do to identify ‘social’ preferences. The problem 
is that a single set of social preferences may not exist, so that there is no simple sense 
in which we can discover them. Different groups and classes in society may have 
incompatible preferences, and the outcome of voting may depend on the details of 
voting procedures, or differences in the organizational power of different groups and 
their ability to set agendas.1 The distribution of organizational abilities is a 
particularly important factor. The superior organizational power of patron-client 
factions in developing country democracies can help to explain why electoral 
competition does not in general result in government preferences being set by the 
poor even though they constitute huge majorities. There are, of course, exceptions. 
Economic policy in some developing country democracies is more decidedly pro-
poor. Some arguments about the desirability of democracy extrapolate from specific 
examples of pro-poor state policies in democracies (the state of Kerala in India is a 
particular favourite) to the general conclusion that democracy empowers the poor to 
influence or even determine state policies in ways that help to develop the capabilities 
of the poor to participate in development.2 But in fact, a comparison of Kerala with 
equally democratic neighbouring Indian states suggests that the emergence of pro-
poor economic policies depends on many contingent features of the factional politics 
of particular states rather than on democracy in general. Equally, far less democratic 
states like China (under Mao) or South Korea (in the 1960s) achieved higher scores 
on health and education relative to their comparators at similar per capita incomes. 
Thus, while policy preferences that reflect majority interests can emerge through 
democracy, the latter is neither necessary nor sufficient for this result.  
 
The second type of information argument is that democracy provides greater scrutiny 
for policy and project choices and therefore results in better economic outcomes. This 
is theoretically a more plausible argument, but even here, the linkage is ambivalent. 
Clearly, bureaucrats in charge of project selection need to have incentives for making 
the right choices and should be accountable if they make mistakes, but democracy (as 
a system for selecting and rejecting politicians) may not be either necessary or 
sufficient to achieve this. Even from a narrow information perspective, having more 
points of scrutiny does not necessarily lead to better policy or project choices. In 
particular, if the cost of collecting and assessing information is high, increasing the 
degree of scrutiny could result in bad outcomes.3 If we add to this information 
perspective the observation that the scrutiny in real developing country democracies is 
effectively being practised by political factions who are likely to have sectional 
interests, the outcomes of democratic scrutiny clearly depends on specific local 
factors. This qualified scrutiny can often be better than the alternative, but need not 
necessarily be so.  
 
 5 
The most powerful variant of the information argument is that democracy produces 
information about impending disasters, and therefore, major disasters can be avoided. 
Drèze and Sen famously argued that famines never happen in democracies because 
the press and the opposition ensure that even the most self- interested government 
takes steps to avert major disasters.4 But major disasters need to be defined. Many 
democratic developing countries can live with festering poverty and high numbers of 
deaths due to nutrition deficiency as a ‘normal’ state of affairs. Nor is it strictly true 
that no democratic country has suffered from a famine. The 1974 famine in 
Bangladesh happened under a democratic regime, which turned increasingly 
authoritarian as it failed to manage the economy and polity. Nevertheless, disaster 
avoidance is arguably the most convincing information-based argument in favour of 
democracy.   
 
Democracy as A Regime that Ensures Efficient Institutional Change 
 
A somewhat more sophisticated but, ultimately, unconvincing set of arguments in 
favour of democracy comes from the transaction cost analysis of Douglass North. The 
argument here is that economic efficiency requires the evolution of economic 
institutions and property rights to reduce transaction costs in the market. All 
institutional changes involve winners and losers. Institutional changes that are 
efficient from the perspective of economics are those where the winners gain more 
than the losers lose. If our political institutions ensured that only this type of 
institutional change could happen, these political institutions would promote 
economic efficiency. North argues that for all its imperfections, a democratic system 
with low political transaction costs (the costs of organizing coalitions and reaching 
compromises between them) is most likely to achieve this. By reducing the cost of 
political negotiation, a democracy could assist in negotiating compensations to losers 
that would allow their opposition to efficient policy or institutional changes to be 
overcome.5 Equally, inefficient institutional changes or policies would be rapidly 
blocked by coalitions of losers because their loss would be greater than the potential 
gain of the proposers of the inefficient policies. Democracy would allow potential 
losers to offer enough to proposers of bad policies to stop these policies being 
implemented. The possibility that democracy can assist in introducing efficient policy 
and institutional change and to stop bad policies being implemented is one of the 
underlying arguments in support of democratization in the good governance reforms 
that developing countries are being encouraged to undertake.6  
 
However, as North himself points out, even the most democratic political institutions 
are unlikely to approach zero transaction costs. When transaction costs remain high, 
the cognitive models of participants and their relative bargaining power will matter 
very much in determining the types of institutional changes that are negotiated and 
these outcomes need not enhance efficiency. 7 In fact, the qualification is even stronger 
than North admits. Given very large differences in the political power of factions, 
there is no necessity for winners to offer compensation to losers. Indeed, historically, 
winners have rarely compensated losers, and democracy has never really functioned 
as an efficient institutional system to organize compensation. Rather, both democracy 
and authoritarianism have functioned as mechanisms for managing conflicts and 
suppressing losers.8 Occasionally, democracies have achieved efficiency-enhancing 
institutional changes in developing countries, but when they have, this was not 
achieved through the efficient compensation of losers, but rather through ruling 
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factions using a combination of obfuscation and divide and rule tactics against the 
opponents of reform to achieve their objectives.9 More often, democracies in 
developing countries have found it difficult to organize efficiency-enhancing 
institutional changes because losers could organize resistance through alliances with 
powerful factions. But authoritarian regimes did not necessarily perform better either. 
Some authoritarian regimes did find it easy to override resistance to efficiency-
enhancing institutional changes, but many others found institutional change just as 
difficult to organize as democracies. Nevertheless, we can conclude that if we are not 
close to a world with zero political transaction costs, there is no reason to expect 
democracies to achieve efficiency-enhancing institutional changes faster than 
authoritarian regimes. 
 
Democracies as Systems that Ensure Political and Economic Stability 
 
A recent restatement of the argument that democracies are inherently stable has come 
from Olson, who introduced the metaphor of stationary and roving bandits to analyze 
the predatory tendencies of states.10 In Olson’s stylization, the worst conditions of rule 
are those where societies face the predation of rulers behaving like roving bandits. 
Roving bandits by definition take a short-term view and have no incentive to limit 
their plunder. Development outcomes are dire. Things improve markedly when rulers 
who are roving bandits settle down and become stationary bandits. Although still 
predatory, these rulers take a longer-term view because they will remain in place for a 
long time, and consequently they have an incentive to moderate their extraction. A 
high rate of extraction can shrink the economy to the extent that the rulers’ ‘tax’ take 
over time actually falls. Since stationary bandits will want to maximize their tax take 
over time, they have an incentive to reduce the rate of taxation so that social output 
can rise, and the total tax they collect is maximized. While the higher social output is 
a great improvement, the rule of stationary bandits suffers from periodic crisis due to 
the absence of rules to deal with succession. The transition from one ruler to the next 
is marked by uncertainty and the frequent outbreak of civil war. Democracies end this 
uncertainty and provide rules for the smooth transfer of power. In addition, 
democracies can result in a further reduction of taxation. Even though the majority 
can tax the minority, since the tax benefit has to be spread across the majority, each 
individual within the ruling group get very little and the incentive to organize taxation 
falls. The result is an even greater stability of property rights and political systems. An 
inherent problem with Olson’s approach is that taxation is always seen as predatory 
above a minimum level required to provide basic public goods, so that it is always 
assumed that less taxation is better. Nonetheless, even in terms of Olson’s own logic, 
there are limitations to his argument. 
 
While Olson supported the emergence of democracies in developing countries, he was 
less sanguine about the role of democracy in advanced countries where democracies 
have matured. In the advanced countries he was more familiar with, Olson recognized 
that although democracy can theoretically limit the predation of the state, it could also 
create opportunities for non-state interest groups to increase their rent-seeking 
activities. Thus, in the USA, Olson saw democracy as a much more problematic 
system through which interest groups lobbied for special benefits to the detriment of 
the collective interest. He argued that the longer democracy operates, the higher the 
number of these special interest groups and the more sclerotic mature democracies 
become. Democracies occasionally require a shake-up to destroy the growing power 
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of these special interest groups.11 Indeed in Olson’s view, the destruction of special 
interest groups in Germany and Japan before, during, and after the Second World War 
through a number of very undemocratic processes helped to explain the subsequent 
dynamism of these two economies in the post-war period.  
 
Whatever we make of this particular explanation for the post-war successes of 
Germany and Japan, Olson is wrong to think that interest group-driven redistribution 
is a problem faced only by mature democracies. In fact, the factional competition that 
characterizes developing country democracies is, if anything, more intense than the 
interest group competition in advanced country democracies. The choice in 
developing countries is in fact between different combinations of predation, 
factionalism, and clientelism. Movements towards or away from greater 
democratization can therefore have net effects that are very specific to the factional 
structures of particular countries. In some cases, democratization could reduce 
wasteful predation, in others it could result in greater waste by increasing factional 
rent-seeking activities. Moreover, Olson has no satisfactory explanation for why 
South Korea or Taiwan achieved economic and political stability in the 1960s and 
1970s apart from the observation that they were stationary bandit states. However, 
other stationary bandit states failed to achieve this degree of success. Thus, in the case 
of developing country states no less than in advanced ones, we need to look more 
closely at the structure of interest groups and factions to be able to explain how 
democracy or authoritarianism worked to enhance or diminish economic and political 
stability.  
 
 
The Evidence  
 
From the very large body of evidence and empirical work in this area, I will point to 
some of the evidence that justifies questioning conventional wisdom. The first type of 
evidence comes from cross-sectional data on the economic characteristics of 
democratic and authoritarian countries. The one uncontested piece of evidence in an 
area where much of the empirical evidence and analysis is highly contested is that 
richer countries are more likely to be democratic than poorer ones. This has been 
emphatically demonstrated in many cross-sectional studies, including the extensive 
statistical study of 141 countries over the period 1950-1990 conducted by Przeworski 
et al and by Barro in his work on economic growth. 12 Przeworski et al show that, in 
the long run, per capita income is the best predictor of democracy, and that other 
possible variables, including, in particular, dominant religions, colonial and political 
history, and ethno- linguistic and religious fractionalization do not add much to the 
power of per capita income to predict the likelihood of democracy. Statistically, we 
are also more likely to observe high per capita incomes leading to democratization 
rather than the other way around.13 However, when it comes to explaining why richer 
countries are more likely to be democratic, statistical analysis on its own offers much 
more limited insights. Przeworski et al reject the simplistic modernization thesis that 
argues that democracy will follow once economic development has been achieved. 
Their argument against this position is based on the observation of a significant 
number of relatively rich countries that remain authoritarian. These contrary examples 
show there is no consistent internal mechanism that ensures a transition to democracy 
as countries become richer.  
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Instead, they propose a statistical selection mechanism that is more consistent with the 
historical observations. They suggest that when rich countries become democratic 
(through whatever mechanism) they have a higher probability of remaining 
democratic, while poorer countries who make an early transition to democracy are 
more likely to revert back to authoritarianism.14 This can explain why poor countries 
are statistically more likely to be authoritarian and rich countries more likely to be 
democratic, even without any mechanism to ensure that economic development will 
lead to a transition to democracy. Nevertheless, even if we say that rich countries are 
more likely to remain democratic regardless of how they become democratic, we still 
need to identify the factors that can explain why this should be the case. While the 
authors do not suggest specific mechanisms, they suggest that this could be because 
greater prosperity reduces the severity of distributive conflicts (which undermine 
democracy) and higher levels of education makes it easier to operate democratic 
procedures. But they agree that the mechanisms that make democracies in rich 
countries stable and democracies in developing countries vulnerable are not easy to 
identify with statistics alone.15 
 
A second and very different type of evidence about the operation of democratic 
systems in developing countries is provided by comparative case studies. This kind of 
evidence does not allow the inclusion of every country for which we have data, in the 
way that cross-sectional regression analysis does. But what they lack in breadth, these 
case studies make up in depth. In particular, they allow hypotheses to be identified 
and tested using ‘analytical induction’, a method used to good effect in the work of 
Barrington Moore and his followers on the conditions enabling the emergence of 
democracies in different contexts.16 Applied to contemporary developing countries, 
this approach suggests a very different set of issues affecting the interaction between 
democracy, markets, and states that  determines the nature of the relationship between 
democracy and development. Contemporary case study approaches to the study of 
democracy in developing countries provide a number of critical observations that 
define the starting point of our analysis. 
 
First, they provide very consistent evidence that the politics of developing countries is 
dominated by patron-client factions. This is true for both democratic and authoritarian 
developing countries, implying that democracy in developing countries has features 
that are in general quite different from democracies in advanced countries. These 
features need to be understood if we are to elaborate the relationship between 
democracies in developing countries and the operation of markets and states relevant 
for understanding the prospects of development. Internal political stability in 
developing countries is maintained not primarily through fiscal policy, but through the 
largely off-budget and selective accommodation of factions organized along patron-
client lines. Neither democracy nor authoritarianism appear to do away with the 
factional politics that underly these processes but serve only to modify the processes 
of accommodation, the numbers of factions that are accommodated, the terms of 
accommodation, and the ways in which factional competition is organized.  
 
The common features of this type of politics have been collectively described as 
patrimonialism, clientelism, patron-client politics, and factional politics. The common 
features include the personalization of politics by faction leaders and the organization 
of politics as a competition between factions. The personalization of leadership is not 
based on traditional deference or the greater susceptibility of developing country 
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societies to charisma, but is a rather ‘modern’ phenomenon in that faction leaders 
offer payoffs to those who support them. In turn, they capture the resources for 
making these payoffs by mobilizing their supporters in factions. In India, arguably the 
most successful democracy in a developing country, the deep inter-penetration of 
formal politics with informal structures of networks and factions has been powerfully 
described by Harriss-White and by Jenkins.17 In Africa, it used to be argued that neo-
patrimonialism was due to the absence of democracy, and authoritarianism allowed 
the continuation of personalized politics and the use of informal sources of power by 
the ‘big men’.18 However, it is now more commonly recognized that neo-
patrimonialism and patron-client networks have survived the transition to democracy 
in Africa, and they continue to operate with relatively slight modifications.19  
 
Secondly, parallel to these ‘informal’ political features of developing countries are a 
number of economic characteristics that set them apart from advanced economies. 
These characteristics include a larger ‘informal’ economy, widespread non-market 
accumulation processes (often described as primitive accumulation), and the use of 
state power to create a large range of rents that directly benefit the factions in power.20 
These economic characteristics of developing countries set them apart from advanced 
countries. While democracy or authoritarianism can modify some of these 
characteristic s, democratic and authoritarian developing countries are not significantly 
different in terms of these characteristics.  
 
The ‘informal economy’, describes activities that are not formally regulated by the 
state. These activities comprise as much as 80 per cent  of the economy of the 
relatively highly regulated (and democratic) India.21 This does not mean that large 
chunks of the economy are not regulated; it simply means that these areas are not 
regulated through the formal institutions of the state. These are precisely the areas 
where the regulatory and enforcement capacities of informal networks operating 
within and outside the state become critical for determining the types of economic 
activities that are viable and the ways in which rents are shared between producers, 
political factions and the formal state. This allows us to explain why entrepreneurs in 
developing countries are so willing to invest in factional political networks as an 
ongoing part of their normal commercial activities.  
 
The use of political power in these ways to sustain accumulation in developing 
countries has attracted much attention from conventional economists who see this as 
evidence of rent seeking and political corruption. However, these activities are so 
systematic and widespread that we should look for structural reasons that may explain 
these features of developing countries. Once again, democracy or authoritarianism 
appears at best to modify the nature of these relationships and the ways in which 
political power is exercised. But democracy does not result in a significant change in 
these economic characteristics — in particular, it does not ensure the elimination of 
property rights instability, rent seeking, or political corruption in developing 
countries.22  
 
 
Patron-Client Factions and Democracy in Developing Countries 
 
Given the prevalence of patron-client politics in developing countries, we need to 
investigate the factors that could explain the dominance and the implications for 
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democratization. The analysis of patron-client politics in developing countries has 
drawn heavily on Weber’s analysis of modern bureaucratic states as a foil against 
which to compare and assess developing country realities. Weber saw bureaucratic 
rule as the most rational form of organizing the social order, paralleling capitalism as 
the most rational form of organizing the economy. Bureaucratic rule and capitalism 
are therefore complementary forces that drove the secular rationalization that Weber 
saw as the most significant trend in contemporary history. We will see later that the 
appropriateness of Weber’s conception of capitalism for understanding the emerging 
capitalisms in contemporary developing countries is questionable.23 But interestingly, 
even in terms of his own analysis, Weber saw a permanent tension between the logic 
of bureaucratic rule, which was inherently rational, and the logic of political 
leadership and charisma operating through democratic processes. This tension was 
unavoidable, and even necessary. It was indeed periodically necessary to revitalize 
bureaucratic rule by questioning and changing its objectives, without which it would 
have a tendency to ossify.24 Weber’s analysis is therefore deliberately ‘antinomical’, 
showing the inner contradictions within his ideal types.  
 
Neo-Weberians looking at developing countries have often ignored these subtleties 
and concentrated instead on the checklist of ideal-typical characteristics that a modern 
state should possess, characteristics that are most strikingly absent in developing 
countries. These ideal-typical Weberian characteristics of the modern bureaucratic 
state include a formal, meritocratic bureaucratic structure that adheres to rules, is 
impersonal in its dealings with individual citizens, and represents a sharp separation 
of the private and public spheres. The operations of the typical developing country 
state in contrast are based on personalized exchanges between rulers and their 
factions, bureaucratic rules are regularly broken, and private interests are deeply 
penetrated in the public sphere represented by the bureaucracy. It appears that this 
could provide a compelling explanation of why a rational organization of social order 
does not appear to be taking place in developing countries. The absence of a rational 
bureaucratic struc ture could in turn explain why the development of capitalism has 
been impeded, as capitalism (in the Weberian conception) was the rational 
organization of the economic sphere. If the state was ‘irrational’ in its interventions in 
society, the development of capitalism could not but be affected.  
 
The Neo-Patrimonial Analysis 
  
The question that arises is why developing countries across the board should fail to 
meet the criteria of a Weberian bureaucratic state. Weber lived long before modern 
postcolonial developing countries emerged. His analysis was not about these countries 
at all, but rather about the contrast between ‘rational’ bureaucratic forms of 
governance seen in modern capitalism and traditional forms of authority in pre-
capitalist societies. He identified patrimonial rule as one of the most important of 
these pre-capitalist forms of governance, where allegiance to a leader is based on 
personal loyalty and traditional legitimacy. 25 However, it has become clear that in 
modern developing countries, patrimonial rule is not based on traditional legitimacy 
but rather on modern forms of exchange between patrons and clients, where clients 
agree to provide political support to the patron in exchange for payoffs that the patron 
can deliver by using political power to capture public resources. Based on this 
observation, Eisenstadt, Médard and others have developed the analysis of neo-
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patrimonialism, which seeks to explain the persistence of pre-modern state structures 
in developing countries, particularly in Africa.26  
 
The key characteristic of the neo-patrimonial state is the personalization of power. 
The state is treated as an extension of the property of the leader, and the leader rules 
with the help of clients who get a payoff for their support. Clearly, formal rules are 
now less important than the informal networks upon which the leader’s power is 
based. Indeed, formal rules are regularly flouted and corruption is widespread. In this 
sense, the neo-patrimonial state is the antithesis of bureaucratic rationality. In contrast 
to Weber’s analysis of patrimonialism based on traditional legitimacy, the theorists of 
neo-patrimonialism argue that the basis of this new form of rule is the ability of 
leaders to personalize their power and avoid accountability. The democratic process 
now acquires a significant and very different role in the new analysis that it did not 
have in Weber’s original analysis. Far from political leadership (expressed through 
the democratic process or otherwise) periodically coming into conflict with norms of 
bureaucratic rule, democracy in the neo-patrimonial model is the mechanism for 
undermining personalized rule and thereby allowing the emergence of rational 
bureaucratic forms of rule. The latter is in turn necessary for the deepening of the 
rational capitalist form of economic organization. Democracy thus emerges as the 
process that drives the emergence of capitalism in a way that was never suggested by 
Weber. Variants of this mechanism also appear in good governance models that have 
become popular in policy circles in the post-Cold War period.27  
 
The problem with the neo-Weberian analysis is that it assumes that patron-client 
politics in developing countries is based on the intention of rulers and factions to 
personalize politics and that these intentions do not have significant structural factors 
supporting them. Only if this assumption were true would it make sense to believe 
that subjecting the selection of rulers to greater transparency and competition would 
result in a weakening of personal political fiefdoms and the faction-based exercise of 
power. But, in fact, all the evidence of democratization in developing countries show 
that competition, transparency and electoral contests do very little to undermine the 
dominance of patron-client politics and of informal networks mediating the exercise 
of power. And since states remain informal, the extension of democracy does little to 
further the Weberian goal of constructing rational bureaucratic forms of rule. Thus, 
the puzzle of patron-client politics remains to be explained, particularly since most 
neo-patrimonial analysts rightly argue that political relationships in contemporary 
developing countries are ‘modern’ in the sense that leaders and followers are 
recognizably rational, and neo-patrimonialism is not based on traditional deference or 
culture. Deference for leaders is rarely more than superficial in most developing 
countries, and in addition, wide variations in culture appear to have little effect on the 
salience of patron-client networks. Thus, the evidence, some of which we have 
referred to earlier, requires us to look for other factors that could explain the 
dominance of variants of patron-client political organizations in developing countries, 
both democratic and authoritarian.  
 
At the general level, political competition involves political organizations and 
interests competing to achieve distribution of income and assets that favour them. But 
the nature of the competing political organizations and the types of political strategies 
they employ appear to be significantly different between advanced and developing 
countries and this needs to be explained. I argue that without resorting to the 
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functionalism of modernization theory, we can identify powerful economic factors 
that ensure that patron-client politics is rational for both leaders and organizationally 
powerful constituencies in developing countries. The difference between this and 
modernization theory will be discussed later, but a little reflection on the structural 
differences between advanced and developing capitalist countries tells us why the 
strategies of democratic political players are likely to be very different in the two. In 
advanced countries, a number of structural factors encourage the representation of 
generalized economic and class interests and the formulation of redistributive political 
demands within narrow bounds set by the limits of economic viability. In contrast, in 
developing countries, incentives favour the construction of pyramidal patron-client 
factions that compete for the capture of public resources in ways that are relatively 
unconstrained by economic viability considerations.  
 
Political Competition in Advanced Capitalist Countries 
  
The economic characteristics of advanced capitalist countries have systemic effects on 
the types of political organizations that are likely to develop and the redistributive 
strategies they are likely to follow. These characteristics include the following. First, 
the level of economic development of advanced capitalist countries means they have a 
dominant capitalist sector, and this has significant implications for politics. In these 
economies, the welfare of most people, even if they are not capitalists, depends on the 
health of the capitalist sector. If they are workers, their employment and wage growth 
depends directly on the growth of the capitalist sector. If they are private sector 
professionals, the purchasers of their services are most often capitalists, or workers 
whose spending power depends on the health of the capitalist sector. And if they are 
public sector workers or professionals, their wages and salaries come from taxation, 
which again depends on how well the capitalist sector is performing. Thus, even 
though the substance of democratic politics is necessarily about achieving a different 
distribution of income and consumption from the one that the market might otherwise 
have produced, parties and interest groups soon come to understand that their success 
in mobilizing their constituents and delivering to them depends on maintaining the 
viability of the capitalist economy.  
 
Within these limits, there is, of course, much room for variation. But the self- interest 
of class and interest groups in advanced country democracies tends to ensure that their 
political competition does not damage the viability of the capitalist system. As a 
result, democratic politics remains broadly pro-capitalist even though capitalists are 
necessarily in a minority. This does not mean that the process of politics in these 
countries is always smooth. There may be serious disagreements about what is 
feasible, and occasionally there may be deep crises when economic viability is 
adversely affected. But since all groups and classes suffer from policies that result in a 
shrinkage of the capitalist sector, and since the latter has a shared set of requirements 
for profitability and viability, powerful feedback mechanisms set in to constrain the 
demands of political groups when they exceed the tolerance of the capitalist sector. 
This feedback is particularly constraining when thoroughly anti-capitalist political 
movements in advanced countries are weak or absent, as they have been for most of 
the post-Second World War period, and even more so in the post-Cold War period.  
 
Secondly, a high degree of economic development in advanced countries also means 
that politically active groups can address their redistributive concerns by seeking to 
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influence or control the significant fiscal budget and/or by amending the state’s 
considerable regulatory powers (for instance in regulating the financial sector or 
through health and safety regulations). In practice, this has meant that redistributive 
goals have been pursued through marginal changes in tax and subsidy rates, and 
marginal changes in regulatory structures, subject to the constraint of maintaining 
capitalist viability. Given the significant share of national income that is taxed in 
advanced countries and the very large national incomes, as well as the considerable 
scope and enforcement capacities of state regulation, these strategies have offered big 
rewards to groups engaging in political activity. At the same time, since fiscal and 
regulatory policies benefit everyone who shares these interests (whether class, 
regional or sectoral), a public case can always be made for the proposed changes. 
These characteristics ensure that redistributive agendas in advanced economies are 
likely to be organized around broadly-based organizations that represent the economic 
interests of large groups of individuals, who, in turn, share common economic 
interests or perspectives due to similar class positions in production, regional 
locations, or occupations. The actual delivery of subsidies and the implementation of 
regulations through the bureaucracy can then be achieved through impersonal, 
transparent, and bureaucratic processes in the Weberian sense. This does not mean 
that violations of these norms do not happen in advanced countries. There are always 
going to be incentives for corruption, theft and nepotism. These violations can be 
dealt with by enforcing bureaucratic norms and allowing open and transparent 
political competition.  
 
Thirdly, and very importantly, while economic development allows certain types of 
redistributive goals to be achieved through the budget and through regulatory reform, 
it also rules out certain types of redistributive activity. This is because economic 
development means that most people who own assets or earn an income do so from 
economic activities that are viable. This means that not only do they produce 
economic surpluses, but that the surpluses are large enough to pay for the protection 
of the assets or the economic activities in question. This protection is typically 
organized not just through the employment of private protection for assets and 
activities (such as in the form of guards and lawyers). In addition, the protection of 
assets in advanced countries is primarily ensured through the state, which collects 
significant taxes from asset owners and income earners and uses these resources to 
provide an effective protection of valuable assets and activities.  
 
Economists typically describe advanced countries as having stable property rights and 
a rule of law, with relatively low expropriation risk.28 While the statistical link 
between these variables and economic development is strong, the direction of 
causality is difficult to establish using statistics alone. The interesting question is 
whether property rights in advanced countries are stable because redistributive 
coalitions are sufficiently responsible not to cross the line between redistribution and 
expropriation, or are attempts at expropriation prevented by advanced country states 
because they have the effective power to enforce property rights and protect activities 
as a result of collecting significant amounts of taxes? In reality, both are likely to be 
true, but the voluntary responsibility of redistributive coalitions is unlikely to be 
sustained if coalitions knew they could get away with expropriation. Indeed, the 
economic ability of the state to enforce property rights and prevent expropriation is 
likely to be more important the more open the competition for redistribution. Rich 
countries can afford to have open democracies because the limits to expropriation are 
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set not only by the self- interest of most coalitions (as discussed earlier) but also by the 
strong enforcement capacities of well- funded states.  
 
Political Competition in Developing Countries  
 
In contrast, the conditions that enable transparent and impersonal redistributive 
political activity in advanced country democracies are almost entirely absent in 
developing countries. The less developed the country, the more significant is its 
divergence from the advanced country characteristics described earlier. In upper 
middle- income developing countries, a growing number of characteristics of 
advanced country economies begin to emerge and in these countries, the structural 
differences that affect politics are less stark compared to advanced countries. In our 
discussion, we will not dis tinguish between poorer and more advanced developing 
countries, although there is clearly a grey area between the two, taking into account 
the moderately high levels of economic development in middle-income countries.  
 
The first contrast is that in developing countries, capitalism is not (yet) the dominant 
economic system and so the feedback mechanisms from the economic requirements 
of this sector to the organization of political demands are much weaker. While in the 
very long-term a decline in the growth prospects of the capitalist sector will impinge 
upon the income prospects of most people, in the short or even medium-term, a 
decline in the capitalist sector may not even be perceived by most people. This is 
because the majority of the population continue to live in subsistence agriculture or to 
survive through informal activities like petty production and trade, and their 
dependence on the performance of the capitalist sector is indirect at best. There are, 
therefore, much weaker constraints on the organization of mass movements based on 
populist demands as the participants in these movements do not see any direct effect 
on themselves of an immediate decline in the country’s economic prospects.  
 
Secondly, economic underdevelopment means that not only is the size of the national 
income small, the share of the formal capitalist sector is also small. Therefore, 
compared to advanced countries, the fiscal regime of the typical developing country 
taxes a smaller share of a much smaller national income. Indeed, in poorer developing 
countries, the budget is in deficit after paying the salaries of public employees, and 
even in the relatively more developed of the developing countries, the budget is in 
deficit after paying for the essential infrastructural investments. In most cases, much 
of public investment is financed by borrowing or by aid. Not surprisingly, the budget 
is usually not the primary focus of redistributive political activity in developing 
countries. Nor do redistributive coalitions primarily seek to achieve their goals by 
modifying the state’s regulatory rules since much of the economy is in fact 
unregulated given the limited scope of the modern (capitalist) sector.  
 
It is therefore not at all surprising that redistributive strategies in developing countries 
are typically not defined in terms of the interests of broad economic groups that could 
be met by transparent changes in fiscal or regulatory rules. Rather, political 
entrepreneurs in developing countries who want to achieve redistribution in their 
favour will rationally have to look for other strategies. Political entrepreneurs in most 
countries are likely to come primarily from the middle classes, but middle classes in 
developing countries have some special characteristics. Unlike the middle classes of 
advanced countries, who are mostly professionals and whose economic interests are 
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closely tied to the capitalist sector, middle classes in developing countries consist of a 
collection of classes that can collectively be described as the ‘intermediate’ classes.29 
Political entrepreneurs from different sections of the intermediate classes are unlikely 
to share common interests or to be constrained by the fate of the capitalist sector. The 
only viable redistributive strategy for developing country political entrepreneurs in the 
absence of any fiscal or regulatory space is to organize enough organizational muscle 
to be able to capture resources through a combination of fiscal, off-budget and even 
illegal means.  
 
The intermediate classes include the educated classes with college or university 
education, the petty bourgeoisie, particularly those in the informal sector, and 
middling to rich peasants. This middle strata may be numerically small (possibly ten 
to 30 per cent of the population) and economically weak (compared to emerging 
capitalists), but in terms of legitimacy and organizational power, they are collectively 
the most powerful political group in most developing countries. This group produces 
the political entrepreneurs who lead both organized and informal politics in 
developing countries. Authoritarian regimes have to deal with them and accommodate 
the most powerful and vociferous groups. Equally, without their leadership and 
participation, electoral politics would be impossible. In practice, what we see most 
frequently in the democratic domain are contests between factions led and dominated 
by members of the intermediate classes. And even authoritarian regimes have to 
include enough factions led by intermediate class leaders within the ruling coalition to 
achieve political stability.  
 
The economic structure of developing countries can also help explain the typical 
pyramidal structure of the factions led by the intermediate classes that emerge to 
participate in redistributive politics. As we have already pointed out, the intermediate 
classes consist of a vast group of people of differing social and economic status. 
Many of them are underemployed but organizationally powerful. Political 
entrepreneurs constructing factions can be expected to prefer faction members lower 
than themselves in social and economic status as these individuals will expect less in 
terms of payoffs for participating in the faction and lending their organizational 
weight to it. At the same time, faction leaders want to maximize their organizational 
power by including the most aggressive individuals and sub-factions, without whose 
support faction leaders will be unable to achieve their objectives. Pyramidal patron-
client networks are then likely to emerge as the most rational form of organization for 
faction leaders at all levels of the social structure. Faction leaders promise rewards to 
their clients based on their organizational support, who in turn mobilize those below 
them, all the way down to foot soldiers who may only be mobilized during elections, 
strikes, riots and other political events, in return for very small payoffs. But factional 
membership and activity is rational at all levels of the faction since the payoffs 
available from the faction are always higher than those available from alternative 
types of political activity given the non-existence of budgetary resources and other 
economic features of the developing country economy referred to earlier. The 
difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes in this respect is the number 
of factions that the ruling coalition needs to accommodate for achieving the minimum 
political stability and the types of competition through which insiders and outsiders 
are selected. The ruling coalition is always a coalition of many different sub-factions, 
and irrespective of the type of regime, the ruling group has to make calculations of 
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who to include and exclude using the same logic of cost and benefit as individual 
faction leaders.30  
 
What political factions seek is not the construction of a coalition that can mobilize 
votes to allow a transparent renegotiation of taxes and subsidies, but a coalition that 
can mobilize organizational power at the lowest cost to the faction leader, to achieve a 
redistribution of assets and incomes using a combination of legal, quasi- legal, or even 
illegal methods. The organizational power of the faction is then used either directly to 
capture state power or to force an accommodation in the form of payoffs from the 
factions who are currently controlling the state. The faction’s access to economic 
resources either in the form of revenue or in the power to grab valuable economic 
resources legally or otherwise is then used to benefit faction members all the way 
down the pyramid, though the payoffs may be very unequal for different levels of the 
faction.  
 
While factions may use generalized arguments based on class, region, or interest in its 
public discourse, no-one in society is under any illusion that the faction is out to look 
after itself at the least cost in terms of paying off voters and others who need to be 
mobilized occasionally. When factions do not deliver on these generalized aims, 
broader social constituencies may grumble but they do not really expect anyone to 
deliver on the publicly stated general social goals. However, if factions cannot deliver 
acceptable payoffs to faction members, the leaders are likely to get into serious 
trouble. Factions rarely fear a general public revolt, given that no other political 
organization can deliver what the public wants. What factions actually fear is that 
their sub-factions may be bribed away by other factions and that the coalition may 
crumble. Indeed, this often happens and accounts for the frequent changes of 
government in developing countries that usually lead to no discernible changes in 
government policies, but do lead to different sets of individuals making money in 
turn. Given the opportunistic nature of factional membership and the shifting offers 
and counter-offers made by different factional leaders, it is possible to explain the 
extreme volatility in the factional politics of developing countries in a context where 
government policies are often remarkably constant.  
 
Finally, developing countries are also different from advanced countries in a very 
significant respect: most of the economic assets and activities of a developing country 
(land, or traditional economic activities in the informal sector) are barely viable in that 
they produce very small surpluses, and, in general, do not produce enough to pay for 
their effective protection. It is difficult to explain why property rights are uniformly 
weak in every developing country if we ignore the fact that the effective protection of 
property rights is very expensive, and developing countries typically have pre-modern 
economic systems that do not use existing assets in ways that can generate large 
surpluses to pay for their protection. This has significant implications for the 
strategies that our pyramidal patron-client factions are likely to employ in pursuit of 
their redistributive agendas. If property rights and economic activities are not in 
general effectively protected in developing countries, they can easily become targets 
for the redistributive activity of coalitions seeking redistribution.  
 
If we combine these observations, we find a list of developing country characteristics 
that are very different from advanced countries. Compared with the coalitions in 
advanced countries, redistributive coalitions in developing countries enjoy much 
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greater latitude in the redistributive strategies they can follow because there is much 
weaker political feedback from the capitalist sector. Given this weak feedback from 
the productive sector, the strategies employed by redistributive coalitions in 
developing countries can vary very widely, from growth-enhancing strategies in some 
cases to growth-destroying strategies in others. Secondly, redistributive coalitions in 
developing countries have strong incentives to try and achieve redistribution through 
means that go well beyond marginal changes in taxation, spending, or regulation. This 
is because the relatively limited taxes paid by the small capitalist sector and the 
limited role of economic regulation cannot accommodate redistributive demands, 
however limited. Since public resources for accommodating broadly defined interests 
simply do not exist, political entrepreneurs seek to organize powerful groups that can 
assist their political accumulation and redistribution strategies. Given the structure of 
the intermediate classes, these groups are most likely to be the pyramidal patron-client 
factions that we observe. Finally, developing countries invariably have weak 
protection for property rights across the economy, which opens up a wide range of 
activities and assets to expropriation attempts. Even if assets are not totally 
expropriated by powerful redistributive coalitions, owners of assets, as well as many 
income earners, find they have to purchase protection from powerful factions if they 
are to continue gainful economic activities. Developing countries can thus range from 
situations close to anarchy where neo-patrimonialism acquires characteristics quite 
similar to warlordism to the relatively more normal variety of factionalism where 
property rights are unstable but are protected by patron-client coalitions at a price. 
 
Thus, the economic structures of developing countries create strong incentives for the 
emergence of the very phenomenon that neo-Weberians identify as the variable 
explaining underdevelopment, namely the proliferation of patron-client networks, and 
the domination of personalized politics, variously described as clientelism, 
patrimonialism, and neo-patrimonialism. To that extent, the neo-Weberian argument 
stands reality on its head. The argument that neo-patrimonialism has to be addressed 
first in order to assist development sets developing countries an impossible target. To 
then argue that democratization will assist in achieving the weakening of neo-
patrimonial relationships is even more problematic as a policy prescription because 
the presence or absence of democracy has very little to do with the powerful 
incentives that drive the organization of patron-client politics. Indeed this approach 
can explain why patron-client politics continues to survive and thrive in democratic 
developing countries, an observation that has been referred to earlier in the section on 
evidence.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
I have argued that both states and markets operate somewhat differently in advanced 
and developing countries. Developing country states are significantly penetrated by 
patron-client factions characterized by personalized leadership and the objectives of 
factional rent capture. Developing country markets are characterized by the 
underdevelopment of the capitalist sector, and the use of factional political power to 
protect assets and to support accumulation strategies based on the capture of assets 
using political power. These empirical observations are relevant for explaining the 
vulnerability of democracies in developing count ries, for analysing the conditions 
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under which democracies can survive and where it faces serious constraints, and for 
discussing the implications of democratic processes for economic development.  
 
In contrast to the functionalist aspects of modernization theory, our analysis of the 
economics of developing countries suggests that while democracy is vulnerable in 
developing countries and is likely to operate very differently from advanced countries, 
democracy is not the cause of underdevelopment. Conversely, authoritarianism is not 
functionally required for development. In this sense, our analysis is fundamentally 
different from modernization theory. Instead, we argue that variants of patron-client 
politics are likely to characterize both democratic and authoritarian regimes in 
developing countries. If regime change in a particular country is observed to result in 
a change in performance, the causes have to be sought in the structure of patron-client 
factions in the particular country and the ways in which patterns of accommodation 
and competition are affected by democracy or its absence. The effects of 
democratization can therefore vary from country the country. In some countries, 
democratization could boost development, in others the reverse.31 But general results 
about the effects of democratization are certain to be misleading.  
 
This analysis also challenges some of the core results of the neo-patrimonial analysis 
developed by neo-Weberians, and adopted in different forms in the good governance 
approach. In contrast to that analysis, this argument suggests that democratization 
does not undermine patrimonial politics. This is because the organization of 
personalized patron-client factions is driven not by the absence of democracy but, 
rather, by structural features of the economies of developing countries that make 
modern welfare-driven redistributive politics unviable. Nevertheless, it could be 
argued that since democracy is an end in itself, the support for democratization from 
the neo-Weberian analysis is desirable. However, this does not necessarily follow. We 
are not just referring to the selective way in which democratization is likely to be used 
by Western countries to target some developing country regimes and not others 
depending on their own geo-political interests. There is a much more serious concern.  
 
While democratization is very desirable, the economies of developing countries are 
such that democratization is unlikely to deliver real benefits to a broad range of social 
groups till a minimum level of economic development has been achieved. The 
developmental challenge is how to accelerate that transition, and democratization, 
however desirable in even the most unpromising contexts, has little to do with 
accelerating the social transformations that developing countries require. The pace of 
the necessary social transformation depends on how the competition between factions 
affects the emergence of a capitalist sector, the acquisition of advance technologies by 
that sector, and its ability to begin to compete in global markets. Historical examples 
show that a number of different patterns of patron-client competition are compatible 
with the rapid emergence of such a capitalist sector, while many other patterns of 
factional competition act as a brake on this transformation.32 If accelerating the 
transformation was our objective, these patterns of factional politics should have been 
the target of analysis and of internal policy since they do not correlate in any simple 
way with the democracy-authoritarianism divide. The danger is that by prioritizing a 
series of reforms that have little to do with accelerating the development of a 
productive economy, policy-makers in developing countries are being encouraged to 
expend scarce reform capacities in areas that are unlikely to deliver results in the 
years to come.33 The outcome is likely to be not only slow growth in living standards 
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in very poor economies, but also a much more serious disenchantment with what 
democracy has to offer, and a possible return to equally unpromising strategies of 
authoritarianism. A more realistic analysis of the operation of democracy in 
developing countries is necessary to counter both the excessive faith  on 
democratization as well as to challenge the functionalist defence of authoritarianism 
coming from variants of modernization theory.  
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